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THE PHILIPPINES AND ASEAN 
Options for Aquino 
Donald E. Weatherbee 
Since February 1986 the world has closely watched 
President Corazon Aquino's Philippines. Quite naturally most of the at- 
tention has been focused on the domestic struggle to institutionalize "peo- 
ple power" both administratively and in the process of creating a new 
constitution. Observations on the foreign policy implications of the regime 
change have generally dealt with discussions of the future of the U.S. mili- 
tary base rights in the Philippines. While the U.S.-Philippines security 
relationship is important-some would even say vital-there is another set 
of interdependencies that deserves attention, the Philippines as one of the 
six state actors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Manila is slated to be the site of ASEAN's third summit meeting, now 
scheduled for December 1987. An examination of the Aquino govern- 
ment's international behavior in the ASEAN regional framework gives 
some insight into both continuities and discontinuities in Philippines for- 
eign policy under Aquino, as well as illustrates some of the broader issues 
of the dynamics of regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
The Marcos Government in ASEAN 
In 1967, with the Bangkok Declaration, Philippines Foreign Secretary 
Narciso Ramos in association with the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Ma- 
laysia, Singapore, and Thailand called into existence an organization 
designed to provide the basis for regional economic, social, cultural, ad- 
ministrative, and technical cooperation. In 1976 at the first or Bali Sum- 
mit, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia provided an explicit political blueprint for 
harmonizing the ASEAN nations' foreign policies. Through nineteen 
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years, the Marcos government consistently promoted the ASEAN goals 
and Manila's symbolic support for the organization was impressive. 
In one sense, Philippines membership in ASEAN was a natural conse- 
quence of its previous engagement in earlier efforts in regionalism: 
Maphilindo and the Association of Southeast Asia. The interests that the 
Philippines and the other members sought to pursue through ASEAN 
were both those couched in the generalities of the founding document and 
those of more narrowly defined national self-interest. ASEAN gave the 
Philippines a stage on which to play as an independent, sovereign Asian 
nation, not a trans-Pacific appendage of the United States. It was a vehicle 
for the assertion of a regional identity. Secondly, although it is often for- 
gotten as we view the wreckage of the economy today, in 1967 the Philip- 
pines seemed to be on the brink of becoming a Southeast Asian NIC. 
Manila economists and entrepreneurs saw in ASEAN an opportunity to 
penetrate new markets and reduce their dependency on the traditional pat- 
terns of Philippines trade. 
In terms of the workings of the organization, Manila has been generally 
politically passive, particularly with respect to the Indochina crisis that 
has preoccupied ASEAN since December 1978. Manila has gone along 
with the ASEAN consensus, apparently not having tried to shape that 
consensus or to create diplomatic and political initiatives of its own. In 
part, this may be because of its sense of relative political and strategic 
remoteness from the conflict, both geographically and in light of its Ameri- 
can security linkages. Also, the Kampuchean crisis coincided with eco- 
nomic downturn in the Philippines and the rise of political opposition to 
Marcos. Increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs in the 1980s, the 
Marcos government had little political contribution to make to ASEAN. 
Foreign Minister Tolentino confessed to this at the 17th ASEAN Ministe- 
rial Meeting in July 1984. "While our national effort must now be concen- 
trated in resolving critical domestic economic issues," he said, "we find it 
equally self-evident that any progress on our domestic front must be 
achieved in the context of continued interaction and cooperation with our 
ASEAN neighbours. "1 
On the other hand, the Philippines has been one of the most active pro- 
moters of regional cooperative arrangements and structures in the func- 
tional areas as laid out in the original Bangkok Declaration. An 
organizationally strong and regionally integrating ASEAN was set as a 
1. Straits Times, 11 July 1984. 
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goal by President Marcos as early as 1968.2 This led at times to a Manila- 
Singapore axis in ASEAN as both countries sought to move toward freer 
intra-ASEAN trade. Manila has consistently been supportive of moving 
ASEAN in genuinely integrative directions, sometimes-to Indonesian an- 
noyance-acting as the organizational gadfly. Marcos was the first to call 
for a third ASEAN summit in his address opening the 13th ASEAN Eco- 
nomic Ministers Meeting in May 1982, saying that a summit would pro- 
vide "fresh impetus" for greater cooperation.3 At the February 1984 
gathering of the ASEAN heads of government for the official celebration 
of Brunei's independence, Marcos lobbied his counterparts for a Manila 
summit. By this time, however, his efforts were seen as less directed at 
strengthening ASEAN than burnishing his own political image, and 
ASEAN was not prepared to go along. 
The real payoffs of ASEAN membership to Marcos's government, while 
growing out of the dynamic of regionalisrr, had little to do with functional 
cooperation. Malaysian and Indonesian political commitment to ASEAN 
in the sense of promoting regional security and harmony served to mediate 
potential conflicts between the Philippines and its neighbours. The dispute 
over Sabah, while serving to obstruct Malaysia-Philippines cooperation 
within ASEAN, nevertheless was managed so as to avoid disrupting 
ASEAN. Further, both Indonesia and Malaysia buffered the Philippines 
in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and tempered OIC decisions 
concerning interventions in support of the Moro insurgency. They also 
were able to control the political sympathies of their own Muslim majori- 
ties with respect to the war in the southern Philippines. These issues have 
been inherited by President Aquino. 
Finally, for the ASEAN region, Manila's real importance had little to 
do with its organizational contributions. The U.S. security umbrella over 
the region was founded on the bilateral tie with the Philippines; moreover, 
the credibility of that commitment was validated by the military posture 
permitted by the forward basing of U.S. forces in the Philippines. The 
U.S. in the Philippines became for ASEAN a vital component of the re- 
gional balance of power, particularly in light of the Vietnamese-Soviet alli- 
ance and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.4 The issue of the bases 
2. Chin Kin Wah, The ASEAN Secretariat. Prospects for Reform, paper presented to a 
"Workshop on Factors Affecting Regional Integration," ASEAN Economic Research Unit, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (17-18 December 1981), p. 1. 
3. Straits Times, 21 May 1982. 
4. While ASEAN officials are loathe to go on record with respect to the bases, the consis- 
tent and region-wide privately communicated view is that in the absence of a functioning 
"Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN), a termination of the U.S. base agree- 
ments would be inherently destabilizing without major alterations in the policies of the USSR 
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has become an important part of the Aquino government's informal dia- 
logue with its ASEAN partners. 
ASEAN and the "People Power" Revolt 
In foreign policy as in domestic policy ASEAN elites have a strong predi- 
lection for the status quo. The ASEAN leaderships are essentially con- 
servative with respect to the modalities of change. A key word in their 
political lexicon is "stability." Therefore, it is not surprising that ASEAN 
leaderships generally did not react negatively to Marcos's efforts to control 
events after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino.5 The other gov- 
ernments of the region share in many respects a number of those charac- 
teristics of the Marcos regime that proponents of liberal democracy find 
offensive. It was the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of Marcos's repres- 
sive measures that puzzled ASEAN observers who did not differentiate 
between the Filipino political culture and their own. Moreover, the popu- 
lar "extra-legal" challenge to Marcos, their long-time ASEAN colleague, 
had implications for the other countries in terms of possible demonstration 
or spillover effects. 
The prolongation of the crisis up through Marcos's call for a snap presi- 
dential election dismayed the other ASEAN members. It became obvious 
that the polarization of politics in the Philippines reflected political, eco- 
nomic, and social cleavages that could not be bridged by adaptive conces- 
sions or even greater measures of forceful repression. The ASEAN 
governments were forced to consider possible scenarios with potentially 
disruptive impacts on ASEAN itself. Direct American intervention, for 
example, would lead to ambivalent responses in the ASEAN publics. 
Some members of the ASEAN elite would have welcomed Philippine mili- 
tary intervention, but this too was viewed as only sharpening the differ- 
ences and sure to lead to a civil war. The growing popularity and strength 
of the radical left and the New Peoples Army (NPA) as the Filipino center 
was assaulted by the Marcos regime shocked ASEAN's anticommunists. 
The possibility of the eventual emergence of a truly radical successor re- 
gime, which would have dramatic consequences for ASEAN and the im- 
plicit American security guarantee, could not be ruled out. Given these 
possible alternatives, once it became clear that Marcos could not salvage 
the situation without plunging the country into civil chaos, the ASEAN 
elites realistically accepted the fact that peaceful succession with all its 
and the PRC. The code words for ASEAN support of continuation of the base agreements 
are an "active U.S. presence." 
5. Statements about ASEAN attitudes toward the political struggle in the Philippines are 
based on the author's discussions in the region in 1985 and 1986. 
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policy unknowns was preferable to a Marcos attempt to retain power at all 
costs. 
The deteriorating situation in the Philippines after the February 7, 1986, 
elections, and particularly the increasing violence, set alarms ringing 
throughout the ASEAN region. As an official in Singapore said, there had 
been strong hopes that the vote would create stability, but "now we have 
the worst of both worlds."6 The Jakarta Post, which often reflects Indone- 
sian Foreign Ministry views, said there was worry that "ASEAN's cohe- 
sion and Indonesia's internal stability will be affected by the worsening 
crisis."7 These and similar expressions from Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok 
were officially aggregated by the ASEAN foreign ministers who, on Febru- 
ary 23, issued a joint statement on the situation in the Philippines that was 
released simultaneously in the respective capitals. 
As member states of ASEAN, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sin- 
gapore, and Thailand have followed with increasing concern the turn of events 
following the presidential election in the Philippines. 
A critical situation has emerged which portends bloodshed and civil war. 
The crisis can be resolved without widespread carnage and political turmoil. 
We call on all parties to restore national unity and solidarity so as to maintain 
national resilience. 
There is still time to act with restraint and bring about a peaceful resolution 
of the crisis. 
We hope that all Filipino leaders will join efforts to pave the way for a peace- 
ful solution to the crisis.8 
Even though the foreign ministers refrained from calling upon Marcos 
to step down, the fact that ASEAN formally and publicly addressed the 
issue demonstrated their appreciation of the gravity of the moment. This 
was a significant and unprecedented departure from the established norms 
of intra-ASEAN behavior, which call for nonintervention in the affairs of 
member states. The ASEAN communique was officially and unofficially 
elaborated. A Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "The situation in 
the Philippines reflects the fact that politics in the ASEAN countries is not 
like 15 to 20 years ago, when one man can dictate."9 Regional newspaper 
comment was less restrained. For example, the Straits Times editorialized: 
"The political crisis in the Philippines has worsened to such an extent in 
6. Straits Times, 25 February 1986. 
7. Jakarta Post, 24 February 1986. 
8. Text as given in the Straits Times, 26 February 1986. It differs slightly from the English 
translation of the Thai text as reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: Asia and Pacific (hereafter FBIS, DR/APA), 25 February 1986, p. A-1. 
9. New York Times, 26 February 1986. 
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the past few days that violence and bloodshed can now be avoided only if 
Mr. Marcos steps down from the presidency he so questionably claimed 
after the last election."10 
It was, therefore, with no small sense of relief that the ASEAN capitals 
learned of and welcomed the departure of Marcos for Honolulu. This was 
evident in their quick and warmly-worded official congratulatory messages 
to the Aquino government. It has been suggested that the sending of "con- 
gratulations" by the ASEAN states at this point, in contrast to the "recog- 
nition" accorded by the United States and Japan, implied an ASEAN 
preference to see Mrs. Aquino's succession as a result of constitutional 
takeover rather than revolutionary change. 1I Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Tengku Ahmad Rithauddin said in a statement that Malaysia was gratified 
and relieved over the development and "congratulates the Filipino people 
in their hour of triumph and fulfillment after such a determined and coura- 
geous struggle. "12 Thailand's Prime Minister Prem, speaking on behalf of 
the Thai government and people, said: "We respect and admire the Philip- 
pine people for their struggle which resulted in a peaceful change of gov- 
ernment." 13 While not disclosing the actual contents of President 
Suharto's congratulatory message to Mrs. Aquino, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Mochtar admitted that the political outcome in Manila had af- 
forded ASEAN "relative relief." 14 
While the other ASEAN countries welcomed the peaceful transition in 
Manila, the leader of the new government was an unknown quantity in the 
various capitals. Although familiar faces were seen in the government, 
Enrile being most prominent, the people closest to Mrs. Aquino had not 
previously been part of ASEAN's elite circles. What kind of commitment 
would the Aquino government make to ASEAN? What would be her 
stand with respect to national and regional "resilience" defined as internal 
security? How would she deal with the Sabah question, ASEAN's peren- 
nial irritant? Finally, and in some capitals most importantly, would the 
Philippines continue to contribute to the regional balance of power 
through its security relationship with the United States? 
10. Straits Times, 26 February 1986. 
11. Hans Indorf, "People power: fallout on Asean neighbors," Far Eastern Economic Re- 
view (hereafter FEER), 27 March 1986, p. 33. 
12. BERNAMA (Kuala Lumpur), 26 February 1986, in FBIS, DR/APA, 27 February 
1986, p. 0-1. 
13. "Voice of Free Asia," 26 February 1986, in ibid., 28 February 1986, p. J-1. 
14. FBIS, DR/APA, 26 February 1986, p. N-1. 
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The Aquino Government and 
Commitment to ASEAN 
During the presidential campaign Mrs. Aquino had pledged a special effort 
to revitalize Philippine relations with ASEAN neighbors. She reiterated 
the intention when, only two days after the "people power" revolt had 
installed her in office, she met with ambassadors of the ASEAN countries 
and promised that her government would "work closely" with the other 
member states. In a sense, the new government was officially welcomed to 
the ASEAN ranks when Vice-President and concurrently Foreign Minis- 
ter Salvador H. Laurel joined the other ASEAN foreign ministers in Bali 
at the end of April to meet with President Reagan. The major focus for 
Philippine officials at that time was not ASEAN, however, for this was the 
occasion for the first meeting between the new government and the most 
senior U.S. officials. 
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was the first ASEAN leader 
to meet Mrs. Aquino face-to-face in her new role during an official visit to 
Manila at the end of June 1986. High on the agenda for the talks, after 
preliminary and somewhat effusive expressions of mutual esteem, was 
agreement on the importance of the proposed ASEAN summit in the Phil- 
ippines, both intrinsically in terms of the economic issues to be addressed 
and as a symbolic expression of ASEAN support for the Aquino govern- 
ment. The summit had been agreed upon by the end of 1985, and planning 
for it was already underway at the January 1986 ASEAN senior officials 
meeting in Chiangmai. The accession of Mrs. Aquino, however, gave the 
planned summit a new political quality. In August, President Aquino un- 
derlined the primary ASEAN identity of the Philippines by choosing to 
make her first official trip abroad to ASEAN countries-Indonesia and 
Singapore. It had first been thought that she would travel to Washington, 
but she was persuaded that to visit in the region first would affirm her 
intention to revitalize the Philippines' ASEAN role. 
President Aquino's first opportunity to reaffirm the Philippines' com- 
mitment to ASEAN in a formal structural setting came at the 19th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila on June 23, 1986. Her welcoming 
speech was remarkable in that, rather than relying on the self-congratula- 
tory platitudes that so often have marked the public presentations of high 
level intra-ASEAN dialogue, Mrs. Aquino sternly recited the litany of 
ASEAN's failed expectations and aspirations. Looking forward to the 
planned 1987 summit, she enjoined the foreign ministers to consider how 
far short of its goals of economic cooperation and progress ASEAN had 
fallen and to turn to a reexamination of the kinds of problems that 
threatened to render continued association meaningless. "After 19 years 
1230 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1987 
of existence," she said, "ASEAN should already be evaluating the impact 
of regional economic cooperation instead of endlessly discussing how to 
get it off the ground."'5 
Although President Aquino's candidly critical remarks reflected frustra- 
tion at the slow pace of progress shared by many in ASEAN's various 
public and private constituencies, the way in which she voiced them did 
not sit too well with senior ASEAN officials. As a newcomer to the ranks 
of ASEAN's elite, it was felt that her "blasting" of ASEAN was inappro- 
priate and ill-timed.16 Two months later, on August 28, she opened the 
18th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in Manila. While her message 
was essentially unchanged, it was delivered in a more measured and mod- 
erate fashion. Mrs. Aquino said that although the ASEAN economies 
have tended to go their own separate ways in pursuit of self-interest and 
almost all steps that were essential to the attainment of ASEAN's objec- 
tives have failed, yet peace and stability reigned in the region. Thus, de- 
spite her admitted earlier impatience expressed at the June foreign 
ministers meeting, she could now say that ASEAN would endure regard- 
less of the speed of cooperation. The lesson she had learned in the course 
of her visits to Indonesia and Singapore, she said, was that the real essence 
of the association was in the region's peace and stability and the friendship 
among the six members. 
President Aquino's generalized call for more progress in ASEAN's eco- 
nomic domain was translated into a program of action that builds upon 
the long-established Philippine approach to ASEAN as well as the Aquino 
government's hope that greater economic interaction within ASEAN will 
benefit the Philippines' faltering domestic economy. This vision, first offi- 
cially unveiled during the Jakarta visit, is that of a duty-free ASEAN com- 
mon market by the year 2000. The idea is vigorously pushed by Jose 
Conception, Mrs. Aquino's exuberant and energetic Minister of Trade and 
Industry. The proposal was expected to take center stage at the August 
1986 economic ministers' meeting. As chairman of the meeting, Concep- 
cion drove the discussions into contentious areas that, while not reflected 
in the harmony of the final communique, meant that in private the minis- 
ters were forced to come to grips with functional trade policy areas critical 
to substantive intra-ASEAN trade liberalization. The galvanizing princi- 
15. The text of Aquino's speech, "Time is well past for talking," is in The Diplomatic Post 
(Manila), July-September 1986, pp. 8-9. 
16. The Bangkok Post, 24 June 1986, headlined its story on the Aquino speech, "Aquino 
blasts ASEAN as meeting opens." It mentioned that she received "a standing ovation" when 
she was introduced and "polite applause" after she finished speaking. The author's own in- 
terviews with ASEAN bureaucrats confirm the generally negative reaction to her comments. 
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ple was watered down in the final communique to a noncommittal one- 
liner: "The concept of intra-ASEAN free trade was also discussed and will 
be further studied." Concepcion renewed the Philippines-Singapore 
ASEAN economic policy alliance. In his speech welcoming his ministerial 
colleagues, he declared support for Singapore's proposal of the so-called 
"stand-still and roll-back" approach to nontariff barriers inhibiting intra- 
ASEAN trade.17 
Certainly the openness and new willingness to discuss sensitive issues in 
ASEAN cooperation demonstrated at the economic ministers' meeting 
was in part because of the host government's impatience with the old 
ASEAN ways. This coincided with the sense of urgency felt throughout 
ASEAN officialdom in preparation for the ASEAN summit. Nevertheless, 
the Philippines' enthusiasm for faster and more integrative economic pro- 
gress will probably not be easily translated into consensus, let alone six 
national policies. The high visibility of the Philippines in the 1986 eco- 
nomic forum, coincidental with the government change in Manila, was an 
accident of the ASEAN conference rotation system. The consensual struc- 
ture of decision making in ASEAN continues to inhibit innovation. The 
accusing finger is usually pointed at Indonesia as being the most obstruc- 
tive. 18 The Aquino government will be little better able than its predeces- 
sor to move ASEAN in the direction of free trade, as indicated in the 
February 1987 agreement between President Suharto and Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew that neither a common market nor an ASEAN free trade 
area should be considered at the ASEAN summit.19 
As for ASEAN's function as a political/diplomatic caucus confronting 
Vietnam over Kampuchea, Mrs. Aquino's government to date has fol- 
lowed the line of its predecessor in going along with the ASEAN consen- 
sus. Moreover, again like its predecessor, the Aquino government wants 
to keep its bilateral line with Hanoi open as well as renewing the Philip- 
pines' opening to China. 
The Sabah Issue 
Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir, in offering his warmest congratula- 
tions to President Aquino, gracefully and tactfully alluded to the ongoing 
bilateral dispute over sovereignty in Sabah. He said: "It is our hope that 
Malaysia and the Philippines will be able to gather fresh impetus to ex- 
17. Straits Times, 29 August 1986. 
18. Jose Galang, "Beneficial for whom: Jakarta, Asean's biggest market, opposes a cus- 
toms union," FEER, 18 September 1986, p. 68; "S-E Asian common market stays a dream," 
New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 23 October 1986. 
19. "Stressing solidarity," FEER, 19 February 1987, p. 41. 
1232 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1987 
amine various aspects of our relationship in the interest of even deeper 
friendship between us."20 For a quarter of a century, since initially ad- 
vanced by the Macapagal government in 1962, the Philippine claim to sov- 
ereignty over Malaysia's North Borneo Sabah state has not only irritated 
bilateral relations between the two nations but has impeded ASEAN coop- 
erative activities. Although the claim has not been actively pursued in 
recent years, its continued existence blocks normal exchanges between the 
two states. This has been represented symbolically by the unwillingness of 
a Malaysian prime minister to pay an official visit to the Philippines. Since 
by ASEAN protocol Manila would be the next site for an ASEAN sum- 
mit, the possible nonparticipation of the Malaysian prime minister is one 
of the reasons why no such meeting had been scheduled since the 1977 
Kuala Lumpur summit. 
There had been hopes for a breakthrough at the 1977 summit when 
President Marcos verbally renounced the claim, but this was never fol- 
lowed up by constitutional amendment or statutory enactment to provide 
legal effect under Philippines law. The Philippines national territory con- 
tinued to be constitutionally defined in terms of "historic right" as well as 
legal title and has judicially been understood to include Sabah. The Philip- 
pine Base Line Act of 1968 (Republic Act. No. 5446) is still in force, and 
states specifically (Section 2) that the Republic of the Philippines has ac- 
quired "dominion and sovereignty" over Sabah. According to Malaysia, 
nothing will persuade it that the Philippines has in fact dropped the claim 
but the amending of that act to exclude reference to Sabah.21 
Malaysia hoped that the change in government in Manila would provide 
an opportunity for putting the issue to rest once aud for all. This seemed 
to be promised in April 1986 by Vice-President and Foreign Minister Lau- 
rel in his first major foreign policy statement. Referring to the Philippine 
claim to Sabah, he said: 
For too long has this dispute been allowed to fester and adversely affect the 
relations between the Philippines and Malaysia. We are therefore prepared to 
undertake new negotiations as soon as possible in order to resolve the dispute. 
Our objective is to establish and maintain friendly and neighborly relations be- 
tween our two countries on the basis of good faith and mutual respect, and in 
the interests of truth and justice for all parties concerned. In the process, 
ASEAN would also be greatly strengthened. The final resolution of the Sabah 
question would signal the beginning of a new era in the relations between the 
20. "Malaysia's good wishes for the new Philippines government," Malaysian Digest, Jan- 
uary-March 1986, p. 1. 
21. "No definite steps by Philippines to drop Sabah claim," Malaysian Digest, 30 Septem- 
ber 1984, p. 8. 
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two countries concerned, while reinforcing the growth of closer ties and cooper- 
ation among all ASEAN members.22 
This statement was welcomed by Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku 
Rithauddin who said that Malaysia was prepared to give full cooperation 
to the Philippines to help that country resolve its claim. Prime Minister 
Mahathir, meeting with Laurel in May 1986, emphasized that settling the 
claim would not only improve bilateral relations but would also be in line 
with ASEAN objectives. 
Despite Manila's acknowledgement that a resolution of the Sabah claim 
is a necessary condition for closer Malaysian relations, the rhetoric of rec- 
onciliation has not yet been accompanied by substantive acts of renuncia- 
tion. For example, the framers of the 1986 draft constitution, adopted 
overwhelmingly in the January 1987 plebiscite, consciously did not termi- 
nate the claim in the article on "National Territory."23 Although there is 
no specific reference to Sabah, the provision saying Philippine lands in- 
clude "all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or 
jurisdiction" would include Sabah, according to one member of the draft- 
ing commission.24 
Furthermore, Laurel's purported readiness to open new negotiations 
raises for Malaysia the question of what there is to negotiate. In an inter- 
view with the Sabah Times, Mrs. Aquino is quoted as saying that her gov- 
ernment would engage in "sincere and forthright dealings" with Kuala 
Lumpur in seeking a solution based on the principles of self-determination 
and justice.25 This is not satisfactory to Malaysians who feel that both 
self-determination and justice are already served in the framework of the 
Malaysian Federation. Certainly little progress toward settlement seems 
to have been made. A single secret meeting on the issue was held between 
the two states in July 1986, reportedly without agreement. It can be as- 
sumed that Sabah was on the agenda for the visit of Deputy Foreign Min- 
ister Jose Ingles to Kuala Lumpur at the end of January 1987. A 
subsequent "informal" visit .to Malaysia by Foreign Minister Laurel in 
midyear did not lead to any breakthrough in negotiations. 
22. Salvador P. Laurel, "New Directions in Philippines Foreign Policy," address delivered 
before the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations, 10 April 1986, text in Foreign Relations 
Journal (Manila), 1:2 (June 1986), pp. 3-4. 
23. Statement by constitutional lawyer Irene Cortes, Executive Vice-President, University 
of the Philippines, on the panel, "The New Constitution and the Rebuilding of Democratic 
Institutions and Processes," at the conference, "A New Road for the Philippines," October 
1986, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 
24. Adolfo Azeuna as quoted in the Straits Times, 27 October 1986. 
25. Straits Times, 4 March 1986. 
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The ambiguities of the Aquino government's approach to the Sabah is- 
sue again reflect structural continuity with the foreign policy of its prede- 
cessor. President Aquino, no more than President Marcos, can escape the 
fact that the Sabah claim is bound up in the irrationalities of Filipino na- 
tionalism as well as the domestic political exigencies of Muslim politics. 
Armed with a new political mandate and a popularly approved full term of 
office, Mrs. Aquino might be in a position to cut through some of the 
domestic interests that have kept the claim alive. But for now the Sabah 
claim continues to operate to bedevil Philippines-Malaysia relations and 
patterns of ASEAN cooperation. The long-awaited third ASEAN summit 
was first scheduled for mid-1987, but within three months of its announce- 
ment it was pushed back to December. By then, it was hoped, the Sabah 
issue would be swept away, no longer motivating Malaysia's reluctance to 
grace Manila with the presence of its prime minister. 
ASEAN and the U.S. Bases Issue 
One item that will not be on the agenda for the projected ASEAN summit 
will be the question of the future of U.S. bases in the Philippines. The 
ASEAN norm of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states 
will apply once again. This does not mean that the ASEAN partners are 
disinterested in the eventual outcome of U.S.-Philippines bilateral negotia- 
tions on the subject. On the contrary, it is very likely that the question of 
the bases, perhaps euphemized in terms of "regional stability," will be the 
subject of off-the-record, private exchanges between President Aquino and 
her ASEAN counterparts. If ASEAN leaders hold true to form, their 
backchannel advice to her will be similar to that they gave to Marcos- 
compromise with the United States and do not force a U.S. withdrawal 
from the bases. 
For the short term, the Aquino government's policy towards the bases is 
satisfactory to ASEAN: honor the agreements in force but make no com- 
mitments in advance about the future. The fear in some ASEAN quarters 
that Mrs. Aquino might give major concessions on the bases to negotiate 
an any price "reconciliation" with the armed left has been dispelled.26 
Furthermore, her options with respect to the bases have not been fore- 
closed through constitutional provisions terminating the U.S. military 
presence. ASEAN is aware, however, of the fact that the new constitution 
has declared the Philippines as "nuclear weapons free" and that it restricts 
executive latitude in decision making on the bases. Any future agreement 
26. This apprehension was expressed to the author in interviews in Indonesia, Singapore, 
and Thailand in July and August 1986. 
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must be ratified by the Philippines Senate, which can put it before the 
electorate in a plebiscite. This obviously means that the future of the bases 
will in part depend upon the outcome of an intensely polarizing internal 
political debate, and at this point no one can judge that outcome. As we 
approach 1988, the year prescribed for the beginning of the second five- 
year review and reassessment of the bases agreement, and then the crucial 
date of September 16, 1990, the start of the one-year prior notice period 
stipulated in the termination clause of the agreement, ASEAN will ner- 
vously have to wait and see. 
Senior Philippine government officials are very aware of the fact that the 
ASEAN partners do have security interests at stake in the outcome of the 
base negotiations. Emmanuel Pelaez, currently Philippines Ambassador 
to the United States, is a major figure in that process. He acknowledges 
that the regional strategic balance contributes to security in Southeast Asia 
and that the Philippines "cannot resolve the question solely on the basis of 
her own self-interest-she must also consider the interests of her neighbors 
and friends."27 More specifically: 
In this endeavor, Philippine leaders cannot afford to be parochial or insular. 
While their primary responsibility is to the people, they cannot discharge that 
responsibility unless they deal objectively and justly with the interests of other 
countries which may be affected by our decisions, especially our ASEAN part- 
ners and Asian/Pacific neighbors, and the countries with whom we have 
friendly relations.28 
The final determinant, of course, will be Philippines national interest. On 
this issue there are deep divisions of opinion, although we may say that the 
perceptual gulf between the Aquino government and the kinds of opinions 
articulated by the late Senator Diokno and the forces he marshalled in the 
Anti-Base Coalition is not as great as that between Marcos and the Coali- 
tion. This essay on the Philippines and ASEAN is not the place to go into 
the internal bases debate or to rehearse the pro- and antibase arguments, 
but we can note a growing consensus within the Filipino elite that ASEAN 
interests in the U.S. contribution to the regional military balance must be 
more concretely expressed. Put bluntly, there is a feeling in Manila that 
ASEAN has been getting a "free ride" on the U.S.-Philippines bilateral 
security relationship. While enjoying the supposed benefits of regional sta- 
bility supported by a balance-of-power, the other ASEAN states have not 
had to pay the political, security, cultural, and other costs of having the 
27. Emmanuel Peiaez, "The Military Bases in the Philippines: The Past and the Future," 
Foreign Relations Journal (Manila), 1:1 (January 1986), pp. 30-31. 
28. Ibid., p. 40. 
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bases. While Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia espouse foreign policies 
of nonalignment, they wish the Philippines to stay aligned. While 
ASEAN's declaratory policy is for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neu- 
trality (ZOPFAN), the Philippines' partners argue that until a ZOPFAN 
can be realized the U.S. presence in the bases is necessary for ASEAN's 
collective security. 
We can discern the emergence of a policy line in Manila that insists that 
there be more burden sharing of the requirements of collective security- 
that the American presence be in some way dispersed. In other words, 
unlike the Marcos government, the Aquino government as a member of 
ASEAN does not want to be isolated with a superpower. While not a 
member of the government then, Raul Manglapus expressed a growing 
elite sentiment when he argued that ASEAN must come to a common 
position and accept an American military presence as a joint political re- 
sponsibility.29 This is a position with which a member of the government 
can associate himself and add that the bases "no longer can be treated in 
the context of Philippine-American bilateral relations."30 Realistically, 
however, it would not seem that there is another context. Significantly, 
Manglapus, who had been elected to the Senate, was named foreign minis- 
ter in September 1987, succeeding Laurel who resigned and allied himself 
with the right-opposition to the Aquino government. 
There is no evidence that ASEAN is examining its "collective responsi- 
bility" or is looking at any concrete measures to pick up the burden in case 
of the "loss" of the Philippine bases. Queries in ASEAN as to the possible 
redistribution of some of the functional tasks and missions now carried out 
from the U.S. bases in the Philippines are turned aside. For example, Sin- 
gapore's Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, when asked if Singapore 
would be willing to provide alternative sites, replied: "Do you know the 
length of the outer perimeter of Clark Air Base? The length of the outer 
perimeter of Clark Air Base is 26 miles. That is exactly the length of 
Singapore."31 This bit of sophistry is often favorably quoted by Singapore 
officials and diplomats. It ignores the fact that facilities do exist in Singa- 
pore, as they do in every other country of ASEAN including Brunei, that 
could pick up some of the slack if U.S. forces had to be redeployed from 
the Philippines. 
Obviously the question of "burden sharing" in ASEAN is not a question 
of facilities, but of politics. As Malaysian security analyst Muthiah Ala- 
gappa put it: "Although the ASEAN states value the bases, they do not 
29. Statement made at the conference, "A New Road for the Philippines." 
30. Ibid. Ambassador Pelaez, responding to Manglapus. 
31. Straits Times, 11 November 1985. 
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want to host them."32 The political question is now even sharper as a 
result of the new face of Soviet policy in Asia after Gorbachev's celebrated 
July 1986 Vladivostok speech. In the speech he stated: "I would like to 
say that if the U.S. were to give up its military presence in the Philippines, 
let's say, we would not leave this step unanswered."33 What the Soviet 
leader meant in terms of specific acts has not been specified. However, 
some Filipinos have sought to link the termination of U.S. base rights in 
the Philippines to negotiations for a reduction of the Soviet presence in 
Vietnam, explicitly casting these moves as steps toward the realization of 
ZOPFAN, thus generalizing, in a very different way, the superpower con- 
text for the ASEAN states. The ASEAN response to what might be called 
the Gorbachev fishing expedition has been extremely cautious. For 
ASEAN, the proof of Soviet intentions is to be found in the USSR's con- 
tinued support for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. 
Most ASEAN analysts would realistically conclude that the prospect for 
a nuclear weapons-free ZOPFAN, in which security equidistance from the 
superpowers can be maintained, is embedded in the global strategic rela- 
tionship between the superpowers. Until the ZOPFAN can be translated 
from a declaratory policy to an operational regional regime, and as long as 
ASEAN finds it necessary for the United States to be a military actor in 
the regional balance, a forced relocation of the U.S. bases from Southeast 
Asia would be destabilizing. Even so, accepting that certain ASEAN 
states-Thailand and Singapore-might be willing to provide some neces- 
sary facilities for U.S. deployments to the region from, say mid-Pacific ba- 
ses, there would be no collective ASEAN response to a termination of U.S. 
base rights in the Philippines. 
The Philippines and National Resilience 
One of the most important shared perceptions in ASEAN is that the major 
threats to its security and stability are internal. Historically, every 
ASEAN state has faced the problem of armed insurgency. One of the 
common experiences often cited as leading to the formation of ASEAN 
was the struggle against armed communism. The ASEAN states have 
sought to deal with internal threat through the application of measures of 
"national resilience," a term that has come to mean the planned mobiliza- 
tion of the social, economic, ideological, cultural, and security forces of the 
state in a politically integrative manner in a developing and equitable econ- 
32. Muthiah Alagappa, US-ASEAN Co-operation: Limits and Possibilities, ISIS Research 
Note (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 24. 
33. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 38:30, 27 August 1986. 
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omy.34 In the logic (ideology) of ASEAN it is both the level of "national 
resilience" and the pattern of ASEAN cooperation that defines "regional 
resilience." For ASEAN leaders, the final years of the Marcos govern- 
ment failed the test of "national resilience." The question now is whether 
President Aquino can get the Philippines back on track so that peace and 
stability is restored and the Philippines can again contribute to "regional 
resilience." 
What can ASEAN do to assist in building "national resilience" in the 
Philippines? The ASEAN states have given Mrs. Aquino political sup- 
port, unhesitatingly and fully accepting the legitimacy of her government. 
And their token measures of economic and technical assistance have sym- 
bolically demonstrated an ASEAN-wide commitment to the Philippines 
recovery. On the other hand, as noted above, there seems little possibility 
that ASEAN will restructure itself so as to promote a larger Filipino share 
in the ASEAN markets. Perhaps ASEAN's greatest economic contribu- 
tion to "national resilience" in the Philippines will come through its bloc 
leverage in the ASEAN "dialogues" with Japan, the United States and the 
European Economic Community. With ASEAN, the Philippines need not 
deal in isolation with its main trading partners. There even may be a kind 
of perversely beneficial spillover into ASEAN in connection with the need 
to restructure Manila's international economic ties. For example, other 
ASEAN countries also suffer from debt burden, particularly yen-denomi- 
nated debt, and there would be strong pressure to generalize relief meas- 
ures for the Philippines to other member states. 
With respect to the coercive or suppressive aspects of "national resili- 
ence"-that is, directly addressing the problem of growing communist and 
NPA strength in the Philippines-there is little the other ASEAN states 
can do other than offer advice from their own successful counter-insurgent 
struggles. There is no question that they are concerned. In every face-to- 
face bilateral meeting President Aquino has had with ASEAN leaders the 
problem of the communist insurgency has been high on the agenda. 
ASEAN leaders have been both troubled and heartened by the Aquino 
approach. They were troubled by the ceasefire and negotiations with the 
armed left because they felt only the government would be willing to make 
concessions. They were heartened by continuity in leadership of the secur- 
ity forces, particularly Gen. Ramos who is well known to his ASEAN 
counterparts. The collapse of the peace talks was not unexpected and, to 
34. The term "national resilience" (ketahanan nasional as it is used throughout ASEAN 
today was first coined in Indonesia in the 1960s. It was popularized by President Suharto and 
propagated in the ASEAN region by Indonesia officials. It has now lost its specifically Indo- 
nesian reference and appears in ASEAN-wide rhetoric. 
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the extent that it galvanized the regime into greater efforts in the field 
against the insurgents, may have been welcomed in other ASEAN security 
circles. While the doctrines of "national" and "regional resilience" mini- 
mize reliance on external assistance, more active and direct American se- 
curity assistance to the Philippines in the war against the insurgents, if it 
should be deemed necessary, would be politically acceptable to ASEAN. 
Conclusion 
Leaders in ASEAN realize that the consensual structure of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations probably could not accommodate a radical 
nationalist or socialist member state. The Aquino government as it is cur- 
rently constituted, while dramatically different in style from most of its 
ASEAN partners, has essentially the same world view and developmental 
orientations as the other ASEAN states. It does not represent political 
discontinuity in the ASEAN regime. As we have suggested above, the 
interests pursued in ASEAN by Manila under President Aquino are not all 
that different from the interests promoted through ASEAN by the Marcos 
government. The Philippines crisis was the first major test of the impact of 
regime change on the workings of ASEAN. The way in which ASEAN 
adapted to the transfer of power in the Philippines bodes well for future 
transfers of power in other states as long as new leaderships share the val- 
ues underpinning what might be called the political economy of ASEAN. 
Ironically, however, President Aquino's promise of a revitalization of 
the Philippines' commitment to ASEAN occurs at a time when ASEAN 
itself is drifting, looking for a new blueprint. The upcoming Manila sum- 
mit is seen as an opportunity to revitalize ASEAN. Perhaps at the site of 
"people power" a new ASEAN political will power can be demonstrated. 
